






















What	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 risk?	 Risk	 can	 impose	 distinctive	 burdens	 on	
individuals:	making	 us	 anxious,	 impairing	 our	 relationships,	 and	 limiting	 our	 ability	 to	
plan	our	lives.	On	the	other	hand,	risky	situations	are	sometimes	exciting,	liberating,	and	
even	empowering.	The	article	explores	 the	 idea	 that	 risk	 can	 result	 in	benefits	 for	 the	
individuals	who	bear	it.	Specifically,	we	evaluate	John	Tomasi’s	claim	that	the	experience	
of	economic	risk	 is	a	precondition	of	 individual	self-respect.	Philosophical	claims	about	
the	 social	bases	of	 self-respect	 such	as	Tomasi’s	have	not	been	 subjected	 to	 sufficient	
empirical	 scrutiny.	 The	 article	 exemplifies	 an	 alternative	 approach,	 by	 integrating	





















it	provokes	anxiety,	 limits	 individual	choice,	and	constrains	our	ability	to	plan	our	 lives.	
Consider	two	individuals	who	enjoy	an	equal	standard	of	housing,	except	that	one	has	a	
secure	 tenancy	and	 the	other	could	be	evicted	at	 short-notice.2	Now	 imagine	 that	 the	
insecure	 tenant	 is,	 in	 fact,	 never	 required	 to	 leave.	 From	one	perspective,	 the	 lives	of	
these	individuals	have,	in	the	end,	gone	the	same.	Nevertheless,	we	can	see	that	there	
are	 some	 important	 respects	 in	 which	 the	 insecure	 tenant	 is	 disadvantaged.	 For	
example,	she	may	suffer	psychological	distress	at	the	prospect	of	 losing	her	home.	She	





There	 is,	 however,	 a	 contrasting	 story	we	 can	 tell	 about	 the	experience	of	 risk.	Risk	 is	
sometimes	 exciting.	 But	 more	 than	 this,	 risky	 situations	 can	 be	 liberating	 and	
empowering;	 they	 offer	 us	 opportunities	 to	 exercise	 agency,	 to	 test	 ourselves	 and	 to	
develop	 self-control.	 Thus	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 wholly	 secure	 life	 will	 seem	 dull	 and	
oppressive	 to	many.	Moreover,	we	 voluntarily	 undertake	 risky	 activities,	 sometimes	 in	







people	 are	 simply	 by	 assessing	 the	 goods	 that	 they	 currently	 possess;	 rather	 ‘one’s	
present	well-being	must	make	reference	to	future	states	by	means	of	the	notions	of	risk	
and	 insecurity	 or	 vulnerability’.5	However,	we	have	 two	 very	 different	 perspectives	 on	






for	 various	 forms	 of	 risk,	 in	 distinct	 contexts.	 The	 paper	 contributes	 to	 this	 task	 by	
exploring	 a	 version	 of	 the	 second	 ‘risk	 as	 a	 good’	 account	 that	 is	 advanced	 by	 John	
Tomasi	 in	 Free	 Market	 Fairness.	 Specifically,	 we	 evaluate	 Tomasi’s	 claim	 that	 the	
‘experience	of	risk	seems	to	be	an	essential	precondition	of	the	sort	of	self-respect	that	
liberals	 value’.6	 In	 Rawlsian	 terms,	 Tomasi	 suggests	 that	 economic	 arrangements	 that	
expose	 individuals	 to	 risk	are	among	the	social	bases	of	 self-respect:	 ‘those	aspects	of	
basic	institutions	normally	essential	if	citizens	are	to	have	a	lively	sense	of	their	worth	as	
persons	and	to	be	able	to	advance	their	ends	with	self-confidence’.7	Thus	he	alleges	that	






economic	 security,	would	undermine	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 realization	of	one	of	 their	
own	most	fundamental	values.	
Our	 motivation	 for	 focussing	 on	 Tomasi	 is	 twofold.	 First,	 he	 advances	 an	 interesting	
substantive	claim	about	the	benefits	of	economic	risk,	which	opens	up	important	wider	
questions	 about	 how	 individuals	 experience	 diverse	 forms	 of	 risk.	 Secondly,	 Tomasi	





make	 good	 on	 this	 bottom-up	methodological	 vision,	 since	 he	 does	 not	 engage	 with	






















good	 for	 people	 when	 such	 benefits	 are	 realized.	 Moreover,	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	
period	 of	 insecurity	 itself	 will	 be	 experienced	 differently	 when	 there	 is	 a	 potential	
upside.	However,	our	focus	on	downside	risks	is	consistent	with	Tomasi’s	account	of	the	













are	 interested	 in	 the	 impact	 of	 risk	 on	 self-concept,	we	 are	 inevitably	 involved	 in	 the	
domain	 of	 perceptions.9	 This	 invites	 the	 objection	 that	 we	 are	 catering	 to	 subjective	




rates	of	 occurrence	of	 adverse	 events.		 Across	 individuals,	 the	 experience	of	 objective	
economic	shocks	leads	to	greater	feelings	of	insecurity	in	terms	of	job	loss,	wealth,	and	
health.11	 Across	 countries	 and	 over	 time,	 subjective	 employment	 insecurity	 closely	
tracks	the	unemployment	rate.12	Secondly,	we	are	focussed	here	on	how	risk	shapes	self-
respect,	not	yet	on	the	further	question	of	what	we	ought	to	do	in	response	to	any	such	













risk	 and	 self-respect,	 as	 well	 as	 presenting	 our	 new	 analyses	 of	 HSE	 and	 BHPS	 data.	
Whilst	 some	 qualitative	 research	 reveals	 the	 benefits	 of	 risk	 for	 self-worth	 and	
confidence,	 our	 analyses	 show	a	 consistently	 negative	 relationship	 between	economic	
risk	 and	 self-respect.	 III	 explains	 our	 pattern	 of	 findings	 by	 outlining	 some	 key	
dimensions	 along	 which	 risky	 situations	 differ,	 which	 in	 turn	 shape	 how	 risk	 is	
experienced.	 IV	 briefly	 addresses	 a	 potential	 objection	 to	 our	 empirically-based	
approach	to	philosophical	debate	about	the	social	bases	of	self-respect.	
I.	TOMASI	ON	RISK	AS	A	PRECONDITION	OF	SELF-RESPECT	
Tomasi’s	 claim	 that	 risk	 underpins	 self-respect	 is	 advanced	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 wider	
project,	one	of	whose	central	aims	is	to	show	that	a	wide	range	of	economic	freedoms	
should	 be	 accorded	 the	 status	 of	 basic	 liberties.	 On	 Rawls’s	 view,	 only	 freedom	 of	
occupational	choice	and	the	right	to	own	private	property	belong	in	this	category,	on	a	
par	 with	 civil	 and	 political	 liberties.	 Further	 questions	 about	 the	 organization	 of	 the	
economy,	 such	 as	 the	 ownership	 of	 productive	 property,	 are	 to	 be	 determined	 at	 the	
legislative	stage	and	shaped	by	a	society’s	particular	circumstances	and	history.13	Tomasi	








should	 receive	 constitutional	 protection	 and	 ought	 to	 be	 limited	 only	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
securing	other	basic	 liberties.	This	argument	for	 ‘thick	economic	 liberty’	 is	 intended	to	
challenge	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 policies	 that	 Tomasi	 associates	 with	 ‘European	 social	





to	 think	 of	 oneself	 as,	 ‘the	 central	 cause	 of	 the	 life	 one	 is	 leading’.15	 A	wide	 range	of	
economic	 liberties	 are	 said	 to	 be	 crucial	 to	 our	 self-authorship	 and	 sense	 of	 self-as-
cause:	
‘A	 society	 that	 denies	 people	 the	 chance	 to	 take	 up	 questions	 of	 long-term	
financial	planning	for	themselves,	or	that	restricts	the	ways	in	which	individuals	
and	 families	can	 respond	to	such	questions,	 thereby	diminishes	 the	capacity	of	






that	 limits	 the	 freedom	 of	 individuals	 to	 negotiate	 the	 specific	 terms	 of	 their	
employment,	 or	 that	makes	 their	 ownership	 of	 productive	 property	 subject	 to	
calculations	about	social	expediency,	no	matter	how	benevolent	their	intentions	
in	 doing	 so,	 thereby	 creates	 social	 conditions	 in	 which	 the	 moral	 powers	 of	
citizens	can	be	exercised	and	developed	in	only	a	stunted	way’.16	
Tomasi’s	 argument	 rests	 on	 a	 false	 dichotomy	 between	 state	 coercion	 on	 economic	
matters	on	the	one	hand,	and	free	exercise	of	 individual	agency	on	the	other:	 there	 is	
little	 recognition	of	 the	 reality	of	coercion	by	non-state	actors.	For	example,	he	claims	
that	 in	 a	 society	 in	 which	 employment	 hours	 and	 pay	 are	 highly	 socially	 regulated,	
‘citizens	would	 no	 longer	 be	 authors	 of	 their	 own	 lives.	 Decisions	 about	matters	 that	
affect	them	intimately	would	have	been	taken	out	of	their	hands	and	decided	for	them	
by	others’.17	But	he	does	not	adequately	address	the	ways	 in	which,	 in	 the	absence	of	
regulation,	such	decisions	are	taken	out	of	the	hands	of	many	individual	citizens	in	the	
face	 of	 the	 power	 of	 employers	 and	 limited	 choice	 within	 the	 labour	 market.	 Thus	
Tomasi’s	 own	 arguments	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 individuals	 being	 able	 to	 exercise	
agency	in	the	economic	domain	point	towards	a	more	expansive	role	for	the	state	in	the	
economy	than	he	wishes	to	admit.18	








two	 notions	 are	 not	 identical.	 	 For	 example,	 consider	 a	 free	market	 society	 in	 which	
economic	 risk	 is	 low	 due	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 people’s	 skills	 and	 preferences.	 Or	 think	
about	a	case	in	which	individuals	voluntarily	purchase	comprehensive	insurance	against	
economic	 risk.20	 In	 these	 examples,	 individuals	 are	missing	 the	 ongoing	 experience	 of	
economic	insecurity,	but	others	do	not	act	to	undermine	their	economic	self-authorship	
in	the	way	that	Tomasi	finds	problematic.	What	would	Tomasi	say	to	these	cases?	Would	







But	 why	 and	 how	 might	 risk	 underpin	 self-respect	 and,	 conversely,	 how	 might	 the	
absence	 of	 risk	 undermine	 self-respect?	 Following	 Charles	Murray,	 Tomasi	 introduces	









economic	 risk,	 for	 example,	 by	 being	 assured	 that	 they	 and	 their	 children	will	 be	well	
provided	for	whether	or	not	they	themselves	contribute,	then	that	status	goes	away’.21	In	
what	ways	is	the	status	of	the	janitor	undermined	in	the	context	of	a	welfare	system	that	
provides	him	and	his	 family	with	economic	security?	More	generally,	why	 is	 it	 that	 ‘By	
insulating	 people	 from	 economic	 risks,	 the	 European	 model	 denies	 ordinary	 citizens	
opportunities	 to	 feel	 the	 special	 sense	 that	 they	 have	 done	 something	 genuinely	
important	with	their	lives’?22	
The	 claim	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 economic	 risk	 enhances	 self-respect	 initially	 looks	
puzzling.	How	can	the	threat	that	something	bad	will	happen	to	us	be	good	for	our	sense	
of	 self?23	 In	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 Tomasi’s	 claim,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 distinguish	 three	
potential	mechanisms	linking	risk	with	greater	self-respect.	First,	risk	might	have	a	direct	
positive	impact	on	individual	self-concept.	Perhaps	facing	an	unknown	future	gives	us	a	


















realized.	 Secondly,	 the	 beneficial	 effects	 of	 risk	 on	 self-respect	might	 be	mediated	 by	
behaviour.	Understood	in	this	way,	Tomasi’s	claim	is	that	individuals	act	differently	when	
they	 are	 insecure	 and,	 specifically,	 they	 behave	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 conducive	 to	 the	
development	or	maintenance	of	self-respect.	For	example,	perhaps	people	work	harder	
under	risk	and	thereby	gain	 in	confidence	or	 reinforce	their	sense	of	 their	own	worth.	
Thirdly,	 we	 should	 consider	 the	 social	 meaning	 of	 risk:	 when	 an	 individual	 or	
organization	exposes	us	to,	or	declines	to	protect	us	against,	avoidable	risk	they	express	
something	about	how	they	 regard	us.	Specifically,	allowing	an	 individual	 to	bear	a	 risk	
can	be	a	way	of	communicating	trust	and	confidence	in	her	capacities	that	may,	in	turn,	
reinforce	her	self-confidence.	Tomasi	evokes	this	picture	of	the	expressive	dimension	of	
risk	when	 he	 asks:	 ‘How	 can	 individuals	 have	 self-respect	 if	 their	 fellow	 citizens	 deny	
them	the	right	to	decide	for	themselves	how	many	hours	they	will	work	each	week	and	
under	 what	 precise	 terms	 and	 conditions?	 How	 can	 they	 think	 of	 themselves	 as	
esteemed	by	their	fellow	citizens	if	those	citizens	call	on	the	coercive	force	of	the	law	to	
impede	them	in	deciding	for	themselves	how	much	(or	little)	to	save	for	retirement,	the	









respect.	However,	 for	each	of	 the	positive	mechanisms	outlined	above,	 there	 is	also	a	
negative	 story	 we	 can	 tell	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 risk	 on	 self-respect.	 Perhaps	 the	
experience	of	 risk	creates	 feelings	of	helplessness,	 rather	 than	enhancing	our	sense	of	
agency.	 	 In	 the	 face	 of	 risk,	 we	might	 become	 demotivated,	 rather	 than	 driven.	 And	
perhaps	 the	 true	 social	 meaning	 of	 economic	 risk	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 disregard	 and	
devaluing,	 rather	 than	 trust	 and	 confidence.	 In	 order	 to	 adjudicate	 between	 these	
competing	narratives	we	need	to	bring	empirical	evidence	to	bear.	
Empirical	 researchers	 are	 increasingly	 turning	 their	 attention	 to	 questions	 about	 the	
nature	and	consequences	of	economic	insecurity.	For	example,	there	is	growing	interest	
among	 political	 scientists	 in	 how	 perceptions	 and	 experiences	 of	 economic	 insecurity	
shape	policy	attitudes.25	A	more	established	body	of	 research	addresses	 the	 individual	
level	 impact	 of	 job	 insecurity.	We	 have	 long	 known	 that	 job	 loss	 and	 unemployment	
tend	to	be	bad	for	people	in	various	ways,	but	since	the	mid-1980s	researchers	have	also	
sought	to	gauge	the	effects	of	risk	to	one’s	employment	status.	Whilst	individual	findings	






attitudes	 towards	 their	 job	 and	 organization.26	 Indeed,	 some	 studies	 report	 that	 the	
negative	 effects	 of	 job	 insecurity	 exceed	 those	 of	 job	 loss.	 For	 example,	 in	 their	
longitudinal	 study	 of	 a	 large	 Australian	 organization	 in	which	 jobs	were	 under	 threat,	





related	 findings	 from	 the	 job	 insecurity	 literature	 that	 speak	 to	 the	 question	 of	 self-
respect.	 Specifically,	 several	 studies	 report	 that	 insecurity	 tends	 to	 lead	 to	 job	 and	















We	use	data	 from	the	2011	wave	of	 the	Health	Survey	 for	England	(HSE)29	 to	build	on	
this	existing	research.	The	HSE	is	a	major	public	survey,	focused	primarily	on	population	
health.	 It	 includes	 questions	 on	occupation	 and	perceptions	 of	 job	 security,	which	we	
use	to	construct	 three	measures	of	economic	risk	 (two	measures	of	 job	 insecurity	and	
one	 measure	 of	 income	 insecurity).	 The	 HSE	 also	 contains	 items	 that	 enable	 us	 to	
construct	 an	 index	 that	 captures	 the	 philosophical	 notion	 of	 self-respect	more	 closely	
than	existing	studies.	In	2011,	although	not	in	either	of	the	more	recent	waves,	there	is	
also	 a	 question	 about	 whether	 respondents	 enjoy	 taking	 risks.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	
investigate	 the	more	 positive	 side	 of	 risk	 that	 is	 highlighted	 in	 the	 qualitative	 studies	
discussed	in	Section	E.	Thus,	we	use	the	2011	data	in	preference	to	more	recent	years.	




















he	 claims	 that	 a	 person’s	 self-respect	 is	 diminished	 when	 others	 provide	 her	 with	
‘material	means’,32	but	he	is	apparently	unconcerned	that	transfers	within	families	might	
threaten	self-respect.	This	raises	the	suspicion	that	Tomasi	has,	at	this	point,	lapsed	into	
a	 moralized	 notion	 of	 self-respect	 that	 assumes	 a	 prior	 theory	 of	 rights:	 a	 theory	
according	 to	 which	 people	 have	 a	 right	 to	 inherit	 from	 family	 members	 but	 not	 to	
extensive	 state	 provision.	 However,	 this	 moralized	 notion	 is	 problematic	 given	 the	
justificatory	 purpose	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 self-respect	 is	 intended	 to	 fulfil.	 Specifically,	 the	
appeal	to	self-respect	is	supposed	to	do	work	in	showing	that	a	wide	array	of	economic	
freedoms	should	be	elevated	to	the	status	of	basic	liberties.	Thus	Tomasi	must	resist	the	
temptation	 to	 define	 self-respect	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 system	 of	 rights	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	
justify.33	 Rawls’s	 conception	 of	 self-respect	 is	 suitably	 non-moralized	 for	 Tomasi’s	
purposes,	since	it	does	not	build	in	a	specific	account	of	the	basic	liberties.	
Using	the	HSE,	we	identify	respondents	as	either	having	or	lacking	self-respect	based	on	
their	 answers	 to	 questions	 about	whether	 they	 feel	 good	 about	 themselves,	 and	 feel	
useful	 (corresponding	 to	 the	 dimension	 of	 self-	 and	 plan-worth)	 and	 about	 their	
confidence	and	ability	to	deal	with	problems	(corresponding	to	belief	 in	their	ability	to	







either	 ‘often’	 or	 ‘all	 of	 the	 time’.34	 It	might	 be	 objected	 here	 that	 feeling	 good	 about	
myself	 is	not	 the	same	as	having	a	sense	of	my	worth	and	the	worth	of	my	plans.	For	
example,	 I	 could	 have	 positive	 feelings	 about	 myself	 because	 of	 something	 I	 have	
achieved,	 whilst	 lacking	 the	more	 basic	 sense	 of	 my	 worth	 as	 a	 person	 that	 is	 a	 key	
element	 of	 self-respect.	 Our	 response	 to	 this	 worry	 is	 partly	 conceptual	 and	 partly	
empirical.	 On	 the	 conceptual	 side,	 feeling	 good	 about	 oneself	 and	 feeling	 useful	
together	capture	at	least	part	of	the	Rawlsian	notion	of	self-worth.	Whilst	the	measures	
are	not	perfect,	they	come	closer	than	any	existing	outcomes	in	the	literature	on	risk	and	
they	 represent	 an	 improvement	 on	 speculative	 claims	 about	 the	 social	 bases	 of	 self-


















subjective	probability	 individuals	ascribe	to	 losing	their	 job	and	becoming	unemployed	
in	the	next	twelve	months.	Respondents	are	asked	to	identify	their	risk	on	a	scale	from	0	





formulation	 we	 are	 simply	 correlating	 attitudes	 with	 other	 attitudes.	 In	 this	 type	 of	
relationship	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 be	 confident	 that	 any	 relationship	 runs	 in	 the	 causal	
direction	 that	 we	 have	 in	 mind.	 It	 might	 be	 that	 low	 self-respect	 leads	 to	 more	
pessimistic	 assessments	 of	 unemployment	 risk.	 Alternatively,	 some	 other	 kind	 of	
attitude	 –	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 risk	 aversion,	 for	 example	 –	 might	 shape	 both	 risk	
perceptions	 and	 self-respect.	 To	 guard	 against	 this	 possibility	we	 therefore	 also	 use	 a	
measure	of	unemployment	risk	that	is	derived	from	the	objective	economic	position	of	
the	respondent.	We	know	the	gender	and	occupation	of	each	of	our	respondents	in	the	
HSE,	 and	 can	 match	 that	 data	 to	 Office	 for	 National	 Statistics	 measures	 of	 the	



































Figure	 1.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	
having	 self-respect	 as	 self-reported	 chance	 of	 job	 loss	 increases.	
Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.		
[[	Figure	2	about	here	]]	
Figure	 2.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	
having	 self-respect	as	occupation-gender	 specific	unemployment	 risks	
increase.	Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.	
Our	 third	measure	 of	 economic	 risk	 draws	 on	 a	 large	 recent	 literature	 in	 the	 political	
economy	of	skills,	which	highlights	that	 investing	 in	skills	 that	are	specific	 to	particular	
jobs,	firms,	or	industries	exposes	the	worker	to	greater	risk	than	a	similar	investment	in	
more	general	skills.	If	skills	are	specific	to	a	particular	industry	or	firm,	then	workers	face	
the	risk	of	 income	loss	 if	that	 industry	goes	into	decline:	the	premium	paid	for	specific	
skills	 is	 (by	 construction)	 not	 available	 outside	 the	 particular	 industry.	 Compared	 to	 a	




in	 the	 International	 Standard	 Classification	 of	 Occupations	 (ISCO)	 coding	 scheme.	 The	
scheme	 uses	 the	 level	 and	 specialisation	 of	 skills	 involved	 in	 different	 occupations	 to	





in	 terms	 of	 their	 required	 type	 of	 knowledge,	 tools	 and	 equipment,	 the	 materials	
worked	on,	or	with,	and	the	goods	and	services	that	are	produced.	These	unit	groups	are	




between	 risk	 and	 self-respect.	 First,	 it	 makes	 the	 possibility	 of	 reverse	 causation	 less	
plausible:	 Low	 self-respect	 might	 lead	 to	 higher	 perceived	 unemployment	 risk	 and	















having	 self-respect	 as	 the	 risk	 associated	 with	 specific	 skills	
changes.	Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	intervals.		
Figure	 3	 shows	 that	 the	 negative	 relationship	 between	 risk	 and	 self-respect	 is	 still	
apparent	 when	 considering	 skill-based	 risks.	 The	 detrimental	 impact	 is	 smaller,	 but	
higher	risks	are	still	(statistically	significantly)	associated	with	lower	self-respect.42	
B.	CAUSAL	INFERENCE	
Interpreting	 the	 relationships	 in	 the	 cross-sectional	 data	 as	 causal	 is	 valid	 only	 if,	
conditional	on	 the	 included	covariates,	 those	experiencing	high	 levels	of	 risk	are	good	
counterfactual	 observations	 for	 those	 at	 low	 levels	 of	 risk.	 Whilst	 there	 are	 strong	
theoretical	 reasons	 to	 assume	 a	 causal	 relationship	 from	 risk	 to	 self-respect	 in	 the	















analysis	 of	 the	British	Household	Panel	 Survey	 (BHPS)44,	which	 shows	how	changes	 in	
risk-exposure	 relate	 to	 over-time	 changes	 in	 self-respect.	 Consistent	 with	 our	 cross-
sectional	 results,	 we	 find	 that	 higher	 risk	 (operationalised	 using	 objective	
unemployment	 risk)	 is	 associated	 with	 lower	 levels	 of	 self-respect.	 That	 is,	 when	
individuals	are	experiencing	periods	of	relatively	high	unemployment	risk,	they	are	less	
likely	 to	 report	 self-respect.	 Thus	 the	 panel	 data	 analysis	 bolsters	 the	 case	 for	 a	
(negative)	causal	relationship	between	risk-exposure	and	self-respect.45	
C.	NON-LINEAR	EFFECTS	OF	RISK	
The	 specification	 of	 the	 models	 in	 the	 main	 analyses	 assumes	 a	 linear	 relationship	
between	risk	and	self-respect.46	That	is,	any	increment	of	risk	is	modelled	as	having	the	
same	(it	turns	out	negative)	effect	on	self-respect.	But	perhaps	this	linear	picture	is	not	
the	 most	 realistic	 representation	 of	 how	 risk	 is	 experienced,	 or	 indeed	 a	 good	

















increase	 self-respect,	 but	 the	 relationship	 reverses	 after	 a	 certain	 point.	 The	 intuition	
here	is	that	relatively	small	amounts	of	risk	might	be	motivating	or	empowering,	even	if	
risk	beyond	a	certain	level	tends	to	become	threatening	or	overwhelming.	
We	can	address	 this	question	empirically	 in	 the	HSE	data,	 through	 the	specification	of	
different	 functional	 forms.	We	do	 find	 some	non-linearity,	but	 there	 is	no	evidence	of	
the	inverted-U,	which	would	imply	a	benefit	to	risk	at	low	levels.	Specifically,	considering	
each	 0.1	 increment	 of	 (self-reported)	 risk	 as	 a	 separate	 category	 indicates	 that	 the	
negative	effects	in	the	linear	model	are	driven	by	people	reporting	chances	of	job	loss	at	
or	above	0.3.	The	effect	on	self-respect	of	subjective	risk	below	this	 level	seems	to	be	
essentially	 zero.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 this	 is	 good	 news	 for	 risk.	 At	 low	 levels	 it	 has	 no	
negative	effect	and	this	area	of	the	subjective	risk	scale	is	where	most	people	rate	their	
exposure:	57%	of	respondents	are	in	the	lowest	three	categories	(0,	0.1,	0.2).	However,	




might	 expect	 that	 different	 circumstances	 will	 lead	 to	 varying	 effects	 of	 any	 given	
increment	 of	 risk.	 In	 particular,	 some	 people	 may	 be	 better	 able	 to	 cope	 with	 risk	
because	of	 their	capacity	 to	draw	on	other	 resources.	Two	examples	of	such	buffering	
resources,	 for	which	we	have	empirical	measures,	 are	 income	and	 the	presence	of	an	
25	
adult	 partner	 in	 the	 household.	 Both	 of	 these	 factors	 might	 lessen	 the	 impact	 of	
employment	 insecurity	 on	 self-respect	 by	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	 individual	
has	a	material	cushion	to	fall	back	on.	It	also	seems	plausible	that	having	a	partner	might	
directly	mitigate	 the	psychological	effects	of	 the	 threat	of	economic	 loss.	 	However,	 in	
our	data	we	 find	no	evidence	of	 this	 kind	of	differential	 impact	 (in	models	 interacting	




everybody	 faces	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 bad	 economic	 outcomes.	 Should	 we	 expect	 the	
consequences	for	self-respect	to	be	the	same	as	for	a	high-risk	subgroup	in	an	otherwise	
economically	more	secure	society?48	Relatedly,	does	the	impact	of	economic	risk	on	self-
concept	 stem	 primarily	 from	 the	 dynamics	 of	 power	 and	 control	 that	 typically	
accompany	 real-world	 risky	 situations?	Or	 is	 self-respect	 also	 threatened	by	economic	













outlined	 in	 section	 I.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 social	 meaning	 of	 risk	 will	 differ	
according	 to	whether	 risk	 is	 something	 that	affects	everybody,	or	only	a	 subset	of	 the	








this	way,	 Tomasi’s	 claim	 is	 less	 about	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 risk	 itself	 and	
more	 about	 the	 sense	 of	 resilience	 or	 confidence	 that	 stems	 from	 having	 faced	
unfavourable	outcomes	in	the	past	and	overcome	them.50	
Using	 the	 BHPS,	 we	 investigate	 whether	 having	 experienced	 economic	 adversity,	 but	
come	out	of	 it	well,	 increases	self-respect.	First,	each	survey	period	 is	categorised	as	a	







respondents	 are	 unemployed,	 long-term	 sick,	 disabled,	 or	 on	 a	 government	 training	
scheme	are	classed	as	bad	outcomes.	Employment	and	self-employment	are	coded	as	
good	outcomes,	whilst	periods	of	maternity,	retirement	and	family	care,	as	well	as	being	
a	 student,	are	omitted	 from	the	analysis	by	virtue	of	 their	ambiguity.	At	each	point	 in	
time,	we	 code	whether	each	 respondent	has	 successfully	 come	out	of	 a	previous	bad	
outcome:	if	they	have	both	a	bad	period	(as	described	above),	and	a	subsequent	period	
in	 employment	 or	 self-employment.	 We	 find	 no	 evidence	 that	 having	 successfully	
resolved	an	adverse	labour	market	situation	in	the	past	improves	self-respect.	Moreover,	
the	 ‘instantaneous’	 effect	 of	 being	 in	 the	 bad	 state	 has	 consistently	 negative	 effects.	
Thus	we	 find	no	 support	even	 for	 the	 looser,	more	 intuitive	 interpretation	of	Tomasi’s	
argument	 as	 concerned	 with	 the	 self-respect	 benefits	 of	 overcoming	 hardship.	 Our	





empirical	 support.	 In	 particular,	 there	 is	 qualitative	 evidence	 showing	 that	 the	







they	 characterized	 the	 value	 of	 risk	 resonate	with	 Rawlsian	 self-respect.	 For	 example,	
some	participants	appealed	directly	to	the	related	notion	of	self-esteem.	Others	talked	
about	 self-improvement,	 an	 increased	 sense	 of	 control	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 agency.	 In	
summary,	 ‘Cultivated	 risk-taking	…	 is	 seen	 to	provide	an	opportunity	 for	 individuals	 to	
display	courage,	to	master	fear,	to	provide	something	to	themselves	which	allows	them	
to	live	life	with	a	sense	of	personal	agency’.52	Lupton	and	Tulloch’s	study	coheres	with	a	
broader	 tradition	 of	 qualitative	 research	 that	 reports	 individual-level	 benefits	 of	 risky	
experiences.	For	example,	in	his	widely	cited	account	of	‘edgework’,	Lyng	emphasizes	the	
sense	 of	 self-actualization,	 self-determination	 and	 confidence	 derived	 through	 the	
confrontation	 of	 risk.53	 Similar	 themes	 have	 emerged	 from	 studies	 of	 risk-taking	 in	
criminology.	 For	 example,	 in	 his	 classic	 Seductions	 of	 Crime,	 Katz	 describes	 how	
‘hardmen’	robbers	gain	a	sense	of	agency	and	control	by	creating	order	within	high-risk	
situations:	 ‘chaotic	 situations	…	are	 transformed	 into	courses	of	action	 that	make	self-
respecting	sense	through	the	imposition	of	the	form	and	discipline	of	a	stickup’.54	
Thus	there	is	evidence	from	a	number	of	disciplines	and	domains	that	supports	the	claim	










these	 diverse	 activities	 had	 a	 key	 feature	 in	 common:	 each	 involved	 the	 individual	
making	 a	 deliberate	 and	 voluntary	 decision	 to	 expose	 herself	 to	 risk.	 Similarly,	 Lyng	
introduces	the	notion	of	edgework	to	capture	a	form	of	high-stakes	voluntary	risk-taking.	
In	 contrast	 to	 these	 accounts,	 Tomasi	 appeals	 to	 self-respect	 to	 make	 a	 case	 for	
widespread	exposure	 to	 involuntary	 risk	 in	 the	economic	 sphere.	On	Tomasi’s	 account	
the	experience	of	 risk	 is	 not	 something	 to	be	 sought	out	by	 a	minority	of	 individuals;	
rather	 ‘Risk	 is	 to	 become	 a	 daily	 necessity	 shouldered	 by	 the	 masses’.55	 Importantly,	
providing	people	with	a	baseline	of	security	is	often	the	best	way	of	enabling	voluntary	
risk-taking	 (and	 its	 self-respect	 benefits).	 Thus	 if	 our	 goal	 is	 to	 increase	 self-respect	
enhancing	 risk-taking	 (rather	 than	 simply	 to	 put	 people	 at	 economic	 risk),	 social	
democratic	 regimes	are	 likely	 to	outperform	models	closer	 to	Tomasi’s	 ideal	of	market	
democracy.56	
We	 conclude	 that	 the	 view	 of	 risk	 underlying	 Tomasi’s	 account	 has	 some	 empirical	
weight,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 context	 to	 which	 Tomasi	 applies	 it.	 However,	 research	 into	
cultivated	 risk-taking	might	offer	a	way	of	partially	 rehabilitating	Tomasi’s	argument:	 if	
some	people	are	more	 inclined	towards	risk-taking	than	others,	perhaps	for	these	risk-













respect.	 In	 other	 words,	 economic	 insecurity	 has	 a	 similarly	 negative	 impact	 on	 self-
respect	even	for	those	individuals	who	express	more	favourable	attitudes	towards	risk-
taking.		This	feature	of	the	data	is	shown	in	Figure	4,	which	displays	the	expected	levels	



















the	 dashed	 line	 those	 who	 do	 not.	 Shaded	 areas	 indicate	 95%	
confidence	intervals.		
III.	CHARACTERISTICS	OF	RISKY	EXPERIENCES	
We	have	 reported	a	divergent	 set	of	 findings	about	 the	 relationship	between	 risk	and	
self-respect.	In	the	economic	sphere,	both	the	existing	evidence	about	job	insecurity	and	
our	own	analyses	of	the	HSE	and	BHPS	suggest	that	risk	is	damaging	to	self-respect.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 an	 established	 body	 of	 qualitative	 research	 showing	 that	
individuals	 who	 participate	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 forms	 of	 risk-taking	 find	 this	 activity	 to	 be	
beneficial	 to	 their	 sense	 of	 worth	 and	 confidence.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 extent	 to	
which	risks	are	voluntarily	confronted	is	perhaps	the	most	obvious	feature	that	accounts	
for	 this	pattern	of	 results.60	 The	 significance	of	 voluntariness	 is	 reinforced	by	 research	
showing	 that	 the	benefits	of	 risk	 are	often	experienced	at	 the	moment	of	deciding	 to	
risk,	rather	than	through	the	ongoing	experience	of	insecurity.61	Part	of	what	is	valuable	
to	 us	 about	 experiencing	 certain	 forms	 of	 risk	 is	 the	 opportunity	 to	 see	 ourselves	 as	
people	 who	 are	 willing	 to	 confront	 and	 to	 choose	 risk,	 and	 this	 value	 is	 lacking	 in	
contexts	of	imposed	risk.	
The	more	general	 thought	here	 is	 that	risky	situations	differ	along	a	number	of	crucial	






respect.	 Risk	 itself	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 delivering	 the	 self-respect	 benefits	
highlighted	in	the	literature	on	cultivated	risk-taking:	It	is	in	part	the	fact	of	not	knowing	
what	 the	 future	 will	 look	 like	 (and	 sometimes	 the	 sense	 of	 danger	 this	 brings)	 that	
activates	 people’s	 sense	 of	 agency.	 However,	 the	 self-respect	 benefits	 of	 risk	 are	
conditional	on	some	key	features	of	the	context.	In	addition	to	voluntariness,	we	should	
consider	 the	 extent	 to	which	 risk	 permeates	 everyday	 life	 or	 is	 contraposed	with	 the	
everyday.62	 On	 this	 dimension	 of	 pervasiveness,	 economic	 insecurity	 again	 looks	 very	
different	from	the	forms	of	risk	that	qualitative	research	has	identified	as	beneficial.	For	
example,	 for	 the	 skydivers	 in	 Lyng’s	 study,	 a	 sense	 of	 contrast	 with	 the	 everyday	
constituted	an	 important	part	of	 the	value	of	 risk.63	Thirdly,	 risks	vary	 in	 the	extent	 to	
which	 they	 are	 experienced	 as	 controllable	 or	 as	 determined	 by	 forces	 beyond	 the	
individual’s	 control.	 For	 example,	 think	 about	 playing	 the	 lottery	 compared	 to	
mountaineering	(for	the	experienced	climber!);	they	involve	very	different	forms	of	risk	












broader	message	 is	 that	 the	experience	of	 risk	 is	more	 likely	 to	 increase	our	 sense	of	
worth	or	confidence	to	the	extent	that	we	perceive	the	situation	to	offer	us	some	degree	
of	control	and	the	opportunity	to	exercise	our	skills.		
We	are	 concerned	here	with	perceptions	 of	 control,	 and	 the	distinction	between	 risks	
felt	 to	 be	 controllable	 and	 those	 experienced	 as	 determined	 by	 outside	 forces	 is	 not	
clearcut	 or	 completely	 stable:	 studies	 suggest	 that	 we	 sometimes	 attribute	 control	 in	
activities	that	are,	 from	an	objective	perspective,	clearly	pure	gambles.66	Nevertheless,	




about	 the	 economic	 domain	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 spectrum	 of	 perceived	 control	 can	 help	 to	
account	for	an	as-yet	unaddressed	complication	in	Lupton	and	Tulloch’s	findings.	Whilst	
we	 have	 emphasized	 the	 contrast	 between	 cultivated	 risk	 and	 economic	 risk,	 a	 small	
subset	 of	 participants	 in	 this	 study	 drew	 parallels	 between	 risk	 in	 their	 leisure	 and	










them	 to	 negotiate	 increasingly	 challenging	 labour	 markets.	 This	 contrasts	 with	 the	
experiences	 of	 a	 group	 of	 car	 workers,	 who	 reported	 a	 lack	 of	 control	 in	 the	 face	 of	
decision-making	 by	 large	 corporations.	 Further	 research	would	 help	 to	 build	 on	 these	
findings.	 For	 example,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 factors	 typically	
associated	 with	 skill	 situations,	 such	 as	 planning	 and	 organization,	 increases	 the	
perception	of	 control	 in	 contexts	where	outcomes	 are,	 in	 fact,	 determined	by	outside	




is	more	 likely	 to	 threaten	 self-respect	when	 the	 potential	 losses	 are	 severe.	 However,	
some	of	the	classic	examples	of	cultivated	risk-taking,	through	which	participants	report	
gains	 to	 self-respect,	 involve	 the	very	highest	 stakes:	physical	health	or	even	 life	 itself.	
We	do	not	have	the	empirical	evidence	necessary	to	test	this	issue	directly.	However,	it	
seems	 likely	to	us	that	the	 impact	of	 the	size	of	 the	stakes	will	be	that	of	a	multiplier:	
where	 the	 other	 dimensions	 of	 risky	 contexts	 (voluntariness,	 non-pervasiveness	 and	





Further	 work	 is	 needed	 to	 build	 on	 this	 picture	 of	 the	 key	 dimensions	 of	 risky	
experiences.	For	example,	our	quantitative	estimates	cannot	capture	ways	in	which	the	
social	 and	 psychological	 meaning	 of	 risk	 may	 vary	 across	 individuals,	 or	 over	 time.		
However,	the	available	evidence	supports	the	following	hypotheses:	first,	the	experience	
of	 risk	 enhances	 individual	 self-respect	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 risks	 are	 experienced	 as	
voluntary,	non-pervasive	and	controllable;	secondly,	the	size	of	the	stakes	reinforces	the	
above	 relationships.	Although	our	empirical	analysis	 is	 restricted	 to	 three	measures	of	
economic	insecurity,	these	hypotheses	allow	us	to	offer	some	tentative	thoughts	about	
the	 relationship	between	 self-respect	 and	 further	 forms	of	 risk.	 For	example,	 consider	
insecurity	 in	 access	 to	 healthcare;	 a	 politically	 important	 aspect	 of	 risk	 that	 differs	
significantly	between	regimes.	Along	the	dimensions	of	voluntariness,	pervasiveness	and	
controllability,	 risk	 to	healthcare	 lies	much	closer	 to	 job	and	 income	 insecurity	 than	to	
the	 various	 examples	 of	 cultivated	 risk-taking.	 Thus	we	would	 expect	 the	 relationship	




attention	 to	 questions	 about	 the	 nature	 and	 impact	 of	 economic	 insecurity.	 Thus	 it	 is	







However,	 Tomasi	 is	 not	 alone	 in	 allowing	 his	 claim	 about	 the	 preconditions	 of	 self-
respect	 to	 float	 free	 of	 empirical	 evidence.	 Much	 of	 the	 discourse	 around	 the	 social	
bases	of	self-respect	 in	political	philosophy	has	a	similar	character.	For	example,	 it	 is	a	
fundamental	 tenet	 of	 philosophical	 writing	 on	 self-respect,	 following	 Rawls,	 that	 self-
respect	 is	 strongly	 dependent	 on	 others’	 affirmation	 of	 our	 worth.	 But	 this	 claim	 is	
typically	 advanced	 without	 reference	 to	 psychological	 studies	 of	 the	 complex	
relationships	 between	our	 self-concept	 and	 how	others	 respond	 to	 and	 evaluate	 us.70	
This	 tendency	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 recent	 work	 on	 property-owning	 democracy,	 which	
involves	 some	 speculative	 claims	 about	 how	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 economy	 shapes	
individual	 self-respect.71	 What	 explains	 the	 disconnect	 between	 philosophical	 and	
empirical	work?	Do	we	simply	need	to	do	more	to	overcome	the	challenges	of	working	
across	 disciplinary	 boundaries?	 Or	 are	 there,	 in	 fact,	 good	 reasons	 for	 wanting	 to	
maintain	the	divide?	
Our	empirical	approach	to	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-respect	











For	 example,	 Lyng	 suggests	 that	 ‘edgework’	 is,	 in	 part,	 a	 response	 to	 a	 lack	 of	
opportunities	for	self-determination	and	self-actualization	within	modern	working	life.73	
Thus	 although	 ‘edgeworkers’	 do,	 in	 fact,	 gain	 in	 self-respect	 from	 their	 risk-taking	
activities,	 if	 Lyng	 is	 correct	 then	 there	 is	 something	 problematic	 about	 the	 conditions	
giving	rise	to	this	effect.	
We	have	two	responses	to	this	kind	of	worry.	First,	insofar	as	we	are	offering	an	internal	
critique	of	Tomasi,	 the	empirical	 strategy	 is	appropriate.	Tomasi	presents	his	 theory	as	
building	 out	 of	 observation	 of	 the	 actual	 concerns	 and	 experiences	 of	 citizens	 in	
advanced	post-industrial	 societies.	However,	he	does	not	engage	with	data	 in	 the	way	
necessary	to	make	good	on	this	methodological	vision.	Secondly,	and	more	generally,	if	
we	want	the	notion	of	self-respect	to	play	an	independent	role	in	our	theory,	then	we	do	
best	 to	 start	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 actual	 social	 bases	 of	 self-respect.	 What	 are	 the	
alternatives?	 The	 first	 is	 pure	 speculation	 about	where	 citizens	would	 get	 self-respect	
under	 more	 ideal	 conditions.	 We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 construct	
contrasting,	yet	plausible	sounding	stories	about	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-










sources	 of	 self-respect	might	 change	 with	 social	 and	 political	 conditions,	 but	 utilizing	
empirical	evidence	is	the	best	way	of	developing	some	plausible	hypotheses	about	how	
self-respect	 would	 behave	 in	 different	 contexts.	 Thus	 although	 Tomasi	 could	 respond	
that	 he	 is	making	 a	 claim	 about	 the	 social	 bases	 of	 self-respect	 under	 counterfactual	





in	 this	direction,	we	become	vulnerable	 to	 the	objection	 that	 self-respect	 is	no	 longer	
contributing	anything	to	the	specification	of	the	conditions	of	a	just	society,	rather	it	 is	
parasitic	 on	 a	 prior	 theory	 of	 justice.	 Once	 we	 have	 understood	 how	 self-respect	 is	
actually	 derived,	 we	 might	 subsequently	 identify	 certain	 of	 these	 patterns	 as	
problematic.	 Hence	 our	 empirical	 approach	 does	 not	 foreclose	 the	 possibility	 that	we	









which	 risk	 ‘becomes	normal	 and	ordinary’.74	 Sennett’s	observation	nicely	 captures	 the	
mistake	in	Tomasi’s	view	of	the	relationship	between	risk	and	self-respect.	Tomasi	is	right	
to	 think	 that	 risk	 can	 bring	 important	 benefits	 in	 terms	 of	 individual	 self-concept:	
research	 into	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘cultivated	 risk-taking’	 bears	 this	 out.	 However,	 he	
mistakenly	transplants	this	vision	of	the	value	of	risk	to	the	economic	domain,	where	risk	
is	typically	unchosen	and	pervasive;	often	feels	uncontrollable	and	involves	high-stakes.	
In	 this	 context,	we	have	 shown	 that	 the	experience	of	 risk	 tends	 to	undermine	 rather	
than	support	individual	self-respect.	The	wider	message	of	this	paper	is	that	we	should	





























































































































Figure	 1.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	 having	






Figure	 2.	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	 having	















Figure	 4:	 Expected	 probabilities	 of	 a	 typical	 respondent	 reporting	
having	 self-respect	 as	 subjective	 unemployment	 risk	 increases.	 The	
solid	line	shows	the	probabilities	for	those	who	enjoy	taking	risks,	the	
dashed	line	those	who	do	not.	Shaded	areas	indicate	95%	confidence	
intervals.		
